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Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-
Fonseca: The Last Word on the Standard of
Proof for Asylum Proceedings?
The United States has long held herself to be a haven for those
fleeing their native countries.' Aliens can seek asylum regardless of
whether they are located at the U.S. border, in the ports, or any-
where within the nation's territory. 2 Those present in the United
States can request a withholding of deportation3 to their mother-
land. The political struggle between this altruistic policy and the de-
sire to preserve America's resources for her citizens, however, has
led to substantial limitations on the ability of aliens to qualify for
exemptions under U.S. immigration laws. 4
To qualify for asylum or withholding of deportation under cur-
rent immigration law, an alien must prove he will be persecuted if
returned to his native country. Traditionally, the "clear probability"
of persecution test was used for withholding of deportation claims. The
codification of the asylum procedure in 1980, 5 however, provided for
the "well-founded fear" test. Division among the circuits regarding
the standard applicable to the two separate proceedings resulted. 6
At the base of the conflict is a general disagreement among courts as
to the actual interpretation of the well-founded fear test.
Faced with the judicial inconsistency, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca 7 recognized a
distinction between the two standards and held that the clear
probability standard of proof did not apply to asylum proceedings.8
The Court declined to set forth guidelines, though, as to the practi-
I See Developments in the Law-Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1286, 1289 (1983).
2 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1982).
3 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982). Both asylum and withholding of deportation were
available procedures before 1980. But asylum was uncodified U.S. policy. Martin, The
Refugee Act of 1980: Its Past and Future, 1982 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 91, 109-10; see
generall. I A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 10-11
(1966).
4 See Developments in the Law, supra note 1, at 1289.
5 See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
( See infra notes 69-70 & 80 and accompanying text.
7 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987).
8 Id. at 1222.
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cal application of the well-founded fear standard." This note exam-
ines the rationale behind the Court's decision in Cardoza-Fonseca, the
development of U.S. refugee law, and the possible ramifications of
the decision on aliens applying for asylum in the United States.
Luz Marina Cardoza-Fonseca' ° appealed the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals' (BIA) denial of her claim for asylum I I under section
208(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.' 2 Consistent with its
previous decisions,' 3 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed the BIA. 14 The court held that the well-founded fear test
was the proper legal standard for asylum claims under section
208(a). 15 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, 16 upholding its previ-
ous conclusion' 7 that Immigration and Nationality Act section
243(h) required a " 'clear probability of persecution' "18 since Con-
gress had not expressly amended the standard of proof when it
amended the statute. 19 The " 'well-founded fear of persecution' "20
test, on the other hand, was held to be the proper standard for sec-
tion 208(a) claims based on Congress' explicit incorporation of the
test into the statute. 2'
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had argued
that the standards were identical because a " 'clear probability of
persecution' " must be proven in order to demonstrate a " 'well-
founded fear of persecution.' "22 The Court disagreed. In support
of its conclusion, the Court examined the language of the pertinent
statutory provisions. 23 It found that the language used by Congress
9 Id.
10 Cardoza-Fonseca was a Nicaraguan citizen who entered the United States legally as
a nonimmigrant visitor. She became deportable when she extended her authorized stay in
the United States. Cardoza-Fonseca v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 767
F.2d 1448, 1450 (9th Cir. 1985), aft'd, 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987).
1 1 Id. at 1450. The BIA held that Cardoza-Fonseca had not met the clear probability
of persecution standard of proof. Id.
12 Act ofJune 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1982)).
13 See, e.g., Argueta v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 759 F.2d 1395, 1396-
97 (9th Cir. 1985); Bolanos-Hernandez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. 767
F.2d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir. 1985); McMullen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 658
F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir. 1981).
14 Cardoza-Fonseca, 767 F.2d at 1455.
15 Id. at 1454. The U.S. Court of Appeals remanded the case back to the BIA for a
factual determination based on the well-founded fear test.' Id. at 1455.
16 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the division among the fed-
eral appellate courts. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S.
Ct. 1207, 1210 (1987).
17 E.g-., Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
18 Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1212.
1') Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 1212-13.
22 Id. at 1212.
23 Id.
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in the two statutes was inherently distinguishable.2 4  The Court
stated that the " 'would be threatened' " language conveyed only an
objective element, 25 whereas the section 208(a) well-founded fear
test relied somewhat on a subjective state of mind.2 6 The Court de-
nied that the "well-founded" qualification of fear removed the focus
on subjectivity.2 7 It also noted the importance of deriving the mean-
ing of a statute from the language of the statute itself.2 8
To confirm that the language in the Acts was consistent with the
congressional intent, the Court recounted a lengthy historical narra-
tive of the two sections and related legislative history.2 9 Highlighted
in the discussion were the practice under section 203(a)(7) of the
pre-1980 Immigration and Nationality Act, 30 the purpose of con-
forming to the United Nations Protocol,3 ' and the congressional ac-
tion that demonstrated the intent to enact two different standards. 32
Significantly, the Court rejected both of the government's main ar-
guments for equating the two standards. First, the government ar-
gued that it was illogical for section 208(a) to give greater benefits
than section 243(h) since section 208(a) incorporated an easier test
for eligibility. 33 The Court attacked the logic of the argument by
pointing out that eligibility for section 208(a) did not guarantee a
right to asylum as the Attorney General had discretionary power to
deny relief.34
The government's second contention was that the two standards
were identical because the BIA equated them in its administrative
24 Id.
25 Id. The alien must prove "by objective evidence that it is more likely than not that
he or she will be . . . persecuted upon deportation." Id.
26 Id. at 1212-13. Theoretically, an alien can have a well-founded fear of persecution
while, at the same time, not being able to show that he will definitely be persecuted when
returned to his homeland.
27 Id. at 1213. The Court referred to a quantitative probability analysis: "One can
certainly have a well-founded fear of an event happening when there is less than a 50%
chance of the occurrence taking place." Id.
28 Id. "We have considered ourselves bound to 'assume that the legislative purpose
is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.' " Id. (quoting Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984)).
29 Id. at 1214-19.
30 Id. at 1214-15.
31 Id. at 1216-18.
32 Id. at 1218-19.
33 Id. at 1219.
34 Id. Once eligibility is met, the Attorney General has the discretionary power to
grant or deny asylum. Id.; see infra note 64. Once the more stringent eligibility test is met
for section 243(h) claims, however, the alien is absolutely withheld from deportation. Id.
Hence, the Court's analysis:
We do not consider it at all anomalous that out of the entire class of'"refu-
gees," those who can show a clear probability of persecution are entitled to
mandatory suspension of deportation and eligible for discretionary asylum,
while those who can only show a well-founded fear of persecution are not
entitled to anything, but are eligible for the discretionary relief of asylunm.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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constructions.3 5 Following a previous decision,3 6 the Court denied
deference 37 to the BIA on the ground that "Congress did not intend
the two standards to be identical."13 8 While acknowledging respect
for administrative determinations, the Court highlighted the ability
of the judiciary to strike down administrative constructions contrary
to congressional intent. 39
A review of the history of refugee law is helpful to understand-
ing the impact of Cardoza-Fonseca. The initial U.S. legislation dealing
with refugees was the Displaced Persons Act of 1948.40 The tempo-
rary Act allowed displaced Europeans, who feared persecution in
their homeland, to enter the United States if they fled pursuant to
race, religion, or political opinion. 4 ' The Internal Security Act of
195042 provided the first means for an alien within the United States
to avoid deportation, but only upon a showing that he would be per-
secuted if returned to his country of origin. 4 3 Under this provision,
the U.S. courts expected the Attorney General to comply with a se-
vere factfinding burden on the alien.4 4 Two years later, Congress
incorporated an amended 45 version of the exemption into the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act.4 6 Section 243(h) of the 1952 Act gave
the Attorney General discretionary power to withhold deportation of
35 Id. at 1220.
36 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
37 For a good discussion of deference, see Note, A Framework for Judicial Review of an
Agenc 's Statutoy Interpretation, 1985 DUKE L.J. 469.
38 Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1221
(1987). Another reason for the Court's denial of deference to the BIA was that the BIA
had not consistently equated the standards. Id. at 1221 n.30.
39 Id. at 1221.
40 Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1951-
1965 (1952), omitted as executed 1982). The provisions of the Act were omitted in the
1964 edition of the U.S. Code after they. expired at the end of December 1951. Before
1948, U.S. immigration laws did not specifically address refugees or asylees. See Review of
United States Law, 1982 MICH. Y.B. INT'L. LEGAL STUD. 541, 543.
41 Refugee entry could be denied, however, if the requirements of the earlier immi-
gration laws were not met and the national origins quota had been reached. Set, Review oJ
United States Law, supra note 40, at 543.
42 Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 987, repealed by Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163.
43 Id. § 23, 64 Stat. at 1010.
44 See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 187 F.2d 137 (2d Cir.), aff'd on other grounds,
342 U.S. 580 (1951); Sang Ryup Park v. Barber, 107 F. Supp. 605 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
45 Congress rewrote the exemption in order to alleviate some of the factfinding bur-
den that the courts had placed on the Attorney General. See T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN.
IMMIGRATION, PROCESS, AND POLICY 639 (1985). But cf Note, .s Yluti and lithholding of De-
portation under the Refugee Act of 1980: Immigration and Vatu'alization Service v. Stevic, 20 TEX.
INT'l. I..J. 367, 371-72 (1985) (no substantial explanation given in the House and Senate
reports for the change from the mandatory provision in the 1950 Act and the.discretionary
provision in the 1952 Act).
46 Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1982)).
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an alien who may be "physically persecuted" in his home country. 47
The standard of proof required by the BIA for section 243(h) claims
was a "likelihood- 48 that the alien would be persecuted if returned
to his home country.
In 1965 Congress amended section 243(h) by replacing "physi-
cal persecution" with "persecution on account of race, religion, or
political opinion."' 49 With.this amendment, more aliens fell within
the range of eligibility. The discretionary power of the Attorney
General remained unaltered. The addition of section 203(a)(7) 50 to
the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1965 allowed the entry of
refugees who fled Communist-dominated countries because of a fear
of persecution. 5 1 They were required to establish a "good reason" 52
to fear persecution.
Demonstrating an effort to conform to international refugee
law, the United States acceded to the United Nations Protocol Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees (Protocol)5 3 in 1968. The Protocol re-
quired signatory nations to comply with articles 2 through 34 of the
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Con-
vention).54 Most importantly, the Protocol defined a refugee by in-
corporating the well-founded fear standard.5 5
The legislative history of the accession showed that the Senate
47 Id. § 243(h), 66 Stat. at 214. Section 243(h) of the 1952 Immigration and Nation-
ality Act provides: "The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any
alien within the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be
subject to physical persecution and for such period of time as he deems to be necessary for
such reason."
48 See, e.g., In re Janus &Janek, 12 I. & N. Dec. 866, 873 (BIA 1968) (court withheld
deportation upon a showing of the "likelihood of persecution"); In re Kojoory, 12 I. & N.
Dec. 215, 220 (BIA 1967) (likelihood of persecution).
49 Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 11 (f), 79 Stat. 910, 918, repealedby Refu-
gee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102.
50 Id. § 3(a)(7), 79 Stat. at 913.
51 Id. Section 203(a)(7) of the Immigration and Nationality.Act provided in pertinent
part:
Conditional entries shall next be made available by the Attorney General...
to aliens who satisfy an Immigration and Naturalization Service officer ...
that (i) because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, or political opinion. they have fled (I) from any Communist or Com-
munist-dominated country or area, or (II) from any country within the gen-
eral area of the Middle East, and (ii) are unable or unwilling to return to such
country or area on account of race, religion, or political opinion ....
52 In re Ugricic, 14 1. & N. Dec. 384, 385-86 (Dist. Dir. 1972).
53 Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter
Protocol].
54 July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Convention]. Although the United
States is a signatory to the Protocol, it is not a signatory to the Convention: Slevic, 467
U.S. at 416 n.9.
55 Protocol, art. 1.2, 19 U.S.T. at 6225, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, at 2, 606 U.N.T.S. at 267.
Article 33.1 barred the return of a refugee to a territory where he "would be persecuted."
Convention, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176. Article 34 requested that states "shall as far as possible
facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees'." Convention, 189 U.N.T.S. at
176.
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intended the Protocol to be consistent with existing U.S. law. 56 BIA
practice before 1968, however, used the likelihood of persecution
standard for withholding of deportation under section 243(h). 57
The BIA proposed to resolve this discrepancy in In re Dunar.58
There, the refugee contended that the well-founded fear standard
incorporated in the Protocol was the appropriate standard of proof
for withholding his deportation under section 243(h) instead of the
likelihood of persecution standard traditionally used by the BIA. 59
Combining the two standards as if they were one, the BIA held that
in order to have a well-founded fear, the likelihood of persecution
had to exist.60
By enacting the Refugee Act of 1980,61 Congress attempted for
the first time to draw together the scattered existing refugee law. 62
The Act made three major changes in refugee law. First, using the
Protocol's definition, the Act added a definition of refugee to the
Immigration and Nationality Act. 63 Second, the addition of section
208(a) of the Refugee Act of 1980 provided another form of relief
for all aliens-asylum. 64 Finally, the Act amended section 243(h) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act by incorporating the language
56 "It is understood that the Protocol would not impinge adversely upon the Federal
and State laws of this country." S. ExEc. REP. No. 14, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2. Eleanor
McDowell, Office of the Department of State's Legal Adviser, commented as to how the
Protocol would be incorporated into U.S. law: "[T]he existing regulations which have to
do with deportation would permit the Attorney General sufficient flexibility to enforce the
provisions of this convention which are not presently contained in the Immigration and
Nationality Act." Id. at 8.
57 See supra note 48.
58 14 I. & N. Dec. 310 (BIA 1973).
51) Id. at 319.
60 Id. See also In re Williams, 16 I. & N. Dec. 697, 700 (BIA 1979) (alien did not meet
"well-founded fear" test because she did not prove "probable persecution").
61 Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
62 See Anker & Posner, The Forty 1"ear Crisis: A Legislative Historv of the Refugee At of
1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 1 (1981).
(13 Refugee Act of 1980 § 201(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982). "Refugee" is de-
fined in 8 U.S.C. § 110 1(a)( 4 2 ):
The term "refugee" means (A) any person who is outside any country of
such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is
outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership in a particular social group, or political opinion ....
64 Id. § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a). The former limited asylum provision. § 203(a)(7).
was repealed by the Refugee Act of 1980. The asylum provision contained in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a) reads as follows:
The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically pres-
ent in the United States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective of
such alien's status, to apply for asylum, and the alien may be granted asylum
in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determmines
that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of section 1101(a)(42)(A) of
this title.
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from article 33.1 of the Convention 6 5 and by making the withholding
of deportation mandatory. 66 None of the amendments to section
243(h), however, altered the standard of proof applicable to with-
holding of deportation claims. 6 7
Although Congress addressed the standard of proof applicable
to asylum proceedings with the well-founded fear language in the
definition of refugee,6 8 the standard governing section 243(h) pro-
ceedings was not discussed. As a result, federal appeals court deci-
sions were inconsistent on the issue of how to construe and apply the
two standards of proof. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that the well-founded fear of persecution and clear
probability of persecution were equal in Rejaie v. Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service.6 9 The BIA also equated the two standards in prac-
tice. 70 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the BIA
and the Third Circuit in Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Stevic. 7 1
In Stevic, the Court was asked to decide what standard applied to
withholding of deportation claims. After examining U.S. practice
under sections 243(h) and 203(a)(7) of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act, 7 2 the refugee provisions in the UN Protocol, 7 3 U.S. practice
after accession to the Protocol, 7 4 and the changes enforced by the
Refugee Act of 1980, 75 the Court recognized that section 243(h) did
not refer to section 101(a)(42)(A), which defined refugee with the
well-founded fear test. 7 6 In fact, it was section 208(a) that referred
to section 101(a)(42)(A). The legislative history of the Refugee Act
further supported the Court's holding that "the clear probability of
65 Id. § 203(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h). Section 1253(h) of 8 U.S.C. provides:
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien (other than an
alien described in section 1251 (a)(19) of this title) to a country if the Attor-
ney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened
in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.
66 Id.
67 Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 421 (1984).
6 "The substantive standard is not changed; asylum will continue to be granted only
to those who qualify under the terms of the [Protocol]." S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong.. 2d
Sess. 9, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 141, 149.
69 691 F.2d 139 (1982). The plaintiff was denied asylum when he could not prove a
clear probability of persecution. Id. at 147. However, the Third Circuit based its decision
on dictum from a pre-1980 case. See Kashani v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
547 F.2d 376, 378-79 (7th Cir. 1977).
70 See In re Sibrun, 18 1. & N. Dec. 354, 358-59 (BIA 1983); In re Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec.
311,314 (BIA 1982); In re Lam, 18 1. & N. Dec. 15, 17-18 (BIA 1981); In re Dunar, 14 1. &
N. Dec. 310, 319 (BIA 1973).
71 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
72 /d. at 415-16.
7:1 Id. at 416.
74 Id. at 418.
75 Id. at 412-22.
76 Id. at 423.
1988]
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persecution" was the correct standard to apply to section 243(h). 77
The Court observed that the well-founded fear standard was "more
generous" 78 than the clear probability of persecution standard, but
failed to clarify the test for asylum eligibility. 79
Since the meaning of the well-founded fear test was not ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court in Stevic, the issue of the appropriate
standard for asylum eligibility was still unresolved. The Third Cir-
cuit, unlike the other U.S. courts of appeals, continued to equate the
two standards in practice. 80 The BIA also continued to construe the
two standards as identical. In In re Acosta, 8' the BIA ignored the
Stevic analysis and relied on its own interpretation of the statutes and
legislative history. After meticulously analyzing the well-founded
fear test, the BIA held that a distinction between the two standards
could not be made. In light of the judicial inconsistency, a firm judi-
cial declaration distinguishing the standards was sorely needed. 82
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Cardoza-Fonseca did not
overturn or contradict any of its prior holdings. It did, however, ex-
pand upon Stevic. Although Stevic issued general dictum that the
well-founded fear test was "more generous" 83 than the clear
probability test, it did not define the meaning of "well-founded
77 Id. at 430.
78 Id. at 425.
79 Id. -[T]he well-founded fear standard is more generous than the clear-probability-
of-persecution standard because we can identify no basis in the legislative history for ap-
plying that standard in § 243(h) proceedings or any legislative intent to alter the pre-ex-
isting practice." Id. '
80 See Sankar v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 757 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1985)
(applied clear probability standard to an asylum proceeding); Sotto v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 748 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1984) (upheld Rejaie); Marroquin-Manriquez
v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 699 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1259 (1984) (upheld BIA's application of the clear probability standard to an asylum
proceeding). In Bolanos-Hernandez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized that the well-founded fear test was less stringent
than the clear probability test. 767 F.2d 1277, 1282-83 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Hernandez-
Ortiz v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 777 F.2d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 1985); Gar-
cia-Ramos v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 775 F.2d 1370, 1373 (9th Cir. 1985);
Sarvia-Quintanilla v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 767 F.2d 1387, 1393-94 (9th
Cir. 1985); Argueta v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 759 F.2d 1395, 1396-97
(9th Cir. 1985). In agreement with the Ninth Circuit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit maintained that the "well-founded fear" test applicable to asylum eligibility
required less proof than the clear probability test for withholding of deportation.
Youkhanna v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 749 F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 1984);
see also Dolores v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 772 F.2d 223, 226 (6th Cir.
1985); Reyes v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 693 F.2d 597, 599 (6th Cir.
1982). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the two standards were
"very similar" but "not identical." Carvajal-Munoz v. Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice, 743 F.2d 562, 576 (7th Cir. 1984). The Fourth Circuit declined to render a decision
on the issue. Cruz-Lopez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 802 F.2d 1518, 1522
(4th Cir. 1986).
81 Interim Dec. No. 2986, at 5-6 (BIA Mar. 1, 1985).
82 See supra note 16.
8'3 Stevic, 467 U.S. at 425.
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fear."'8 4 The Court only determined that the clear probability stan-
dard was applicable to section 243(h) claims.8 5 Going a step further,
Cardoza-Fonseca established that the standard for section 208(a)
claims was the well-founded fear test, as distinguished from the clear
probability test.
8 6
By announcing the applicable test for asylum proceedings, Car-
doza-Fonseca' contradicted the practiced rule of the BIA that well-
founded fear and clear probability were identical. Part of the BIA's
rationale for this interpretation was based on the nature of the proof.
In Acosta, the BIA determined that the qualification of fear as "well-
founded" ruled out the subjectivity. of the test.8 7 Objective proof of
the likelihood of persecution was mandatory for success in meeting
the well-founded fear test.8 8 The Court in Cardoza-Fonseca dismissed
any notion that the qualification of fear as "well-founded" eliminated
the subjectivity of the test.8 9 By way of explanation, the Court re-
sorted to a mathematical probability analysis.9 0 But, in Acosta, the
BIA used qualitative analysis without a statistical framework.9 1 The
BIA listed the guidelines that supported its conclusion that the two
standards are equal.9 2 A statistical probability explanation of the
standards is not easy to apply in practice. The Supreme Court's
mathematical analysis was unpersuasive when compared to the BIA's
84 Id. at 430.
85 Id.
86 See Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207,
1222 (1987).
87 In re Acosta, I. & N. Interim Dec. No. 2986, at 18.
8s Id.
89 Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1213.
90 Id. See supra note 27.
t In re Acosta, I. & N. Interim Dec. No. 2986, at 25.
One might conclude that "a well-founded fear of persecution," which
requires a showing that persecution is likely to occur, refers to a standard
that is different from "a clear probability of persecution," which requires a
showing that persecution is "more likely than not" to occur. As a practical
matter, however, the facts in asylum and withholding cases do not produce
clear-cut instances in which such fine distinctions can be meaningfully made.
Our inquiry in these cases, after all, is not quantitative, i.e., we do not ex-
amine a variety of statistics to discern to some theoretical degree the likeli-
hood of persecution. Rather our inquiry is qualitative.
Id.
92 Id.
[W]e examine the alien's experiences and other external events to determine
if they are of a kind that enable us to conclude the alien is likely to become
the victim of persecution. In this context, we find no meaningfid distinction be-
tween a staidard requiring a showing that persecution is likely to occur and a standard
requiring a showing that persecution is more likely than not to occur.
Id. (emphasis added).
[he court in Cardoza-Fonseca addressed this argument in a footnote and concluded that
the BIA had not established or even clearly stated that the two standards were "identical,
equivalent, or interchangeable." 107 S. Ct. at 1221 n.30. As the passage makes obvious.
the Supreme Court misinterpreted the BIA decision.
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comprehensive guideline of the evidentiary factors used in the deter-
mination of eligibility for asylum.
Acosta also recognized the inherent difference between asylum
and withholding of deportation. If granted asylum, the alien may
become a permanent resident. 93 Mere withholding of deportation,
however, does not ensure that the alien will be able to remain in the
United States. Rather, it only bars the deportation of the alien to the
country where he fears persecution.94 The Cardoza-Fonseca Court
failed to address this distinction in discussing the government's ar-
gument that the more stringent standard for section 208(a) contra-
dicts the alien's ultimate entitlement. 95 Instead, the Court based its
entire analysis on section 243(h)'s mandatory provision as distin-
guished from the discretionary provision found in section 208(a).96
The Court's apparent refusal to address the BIA's rationale for
equating the two standards may result in the BIA's noncompliance
with the holding in Cardoza-Fonseca. Acosta was decided by the BIA
less than one year after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Stevic.
The Supreme Court's declaration that the well-founded fear test was
-more generous" than the clear probability test did not stop the BIA
from using its traditional assumption that the two standards were
equivalent. Granted, the opinion of Cardoza-Fonseca was more fo-
cused on the well-founded fear test than the Stevic opinion. How-
ever, the Court either ignored or overlooked some of the BIA's
articulate reasoning. Since the BIA consistently held the standards
were identical, Cardoza-Fonseca should have focused more on the un-
derlying rationale of the BIA's practice. 97
A sound basis for the Court's decision in Cardoza-Fonseca was
statutory construction. In its analysis, the Court emphasized the lin-
guistic difference between the wording of the tests-the subjective el-
ement of "well-founded fear" and the objective element of "clear
probability." 98 After a clear explanation of how the statutory lan-
guage supported the difference in the standards, the Court launched
into a rather lengthy historical narrative. The purpose of the review
was to confirm that the statutory interpretation, as it was derived
from the language, was compatible with congressional intent.99 Nev-
93 In re Acosta, 1. & N. Interim Dec. No. 2986, at 28.
94 Id.
95 Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1219. The Court did, however, recognize the distinc-
tion in a footnote. Id. at 1211 n.6.
96 Id. at 1219-20.
97 The Supreme Court avoided placing more emphasis on the BIA's interpretation of
the standards by arguing that the BIA was not entitled to deference. Id. at 1220. But see
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1224-25
(1987) (Scalia J., concurring).
98 Cardo:a-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1212-13. See supra note 27 and text accompanying
notes 87-90.
I d. at 1213 n.12.
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ertheless, the Court's historical analysis was not flawless.
First, the Court reviewed procedure under the former section
203(a)(7) in order to determine whether Congress intended the sec-
tion 203(a)(7) standard to be used in asylum proceedings. The "fear
of persecution" standard was used for claims under section
203(a)(7).100 The standard used in informal parole proceedings,
however, was similar to that of the withholding of deportation pro-
ceedings. 10 1 Legislative history was clear on the point that the Con-
gress did not intend to change the test used for asylum claims.' 02
The Court contended that Congress wanted to retain the standard
used under section 203(a)(7).103 In his dissent, Justice Powell vehe-
mently argued that the legislative history indicated Congress' intent
to retain the standard used for informal parole proceedings. 10 4 Un-
fortunately, congressional intent on this point was not clear and gave
no strength to the Court's contention.
In its review of the United Nations Protocol, the Court com-
pared the provisions of 243(h) and 208(a) with articles 33.1 and 34
of the Convention. It concluded that the "would be threatened" test
of 243(h) is also in article 33.1105 and that section 208(a)'s discre-
tionary component corresponded to article 34's 106 provision for not
requiring authorization to all aliens eligible for asylum under
208(a). 10 7 The Court did not cite an authority as to the effect of
article 34. Article 34 does not have the "would be threatened" quali-
fication and in that sense it is more similar to section 208(a); however
the language of article 34 does not convey the discretionary element
that the Court suggested it had.' 08
Finally, the Court attempted to show that Congress recognized
a difference between the two standards.' 0 9 The Court relied on the
premise that Senate action "indicate[d]" a recognition of the differ-
ence and that the enactment of the House Bill "demonstrate[d]"
congressional intent to have a less stringent standard for asylum. '1
100 Id. at 1214.
10)l See 8 C.F.R. § 236.3(a)(2) (1987). In an asylum proceeding, "[t]he applicant has
the burden of satisfying the Immigration Judge that he would be subject to persecution on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion as claimed." Id. (emphasis added).
102 See supra note 68.
10"3 Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1215.
104 Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1229
(1987) (Powell, J., dissenting).
105 Convention, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176.
1 Mi Id.
107 Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1218.
" See supra note 55 and accompanying text. Incidentally, in its summary of the effect
of the distinction between the articles, the Court confused the articles' provisions. It
stated that article 33.1 had the discretionary provision and article 34 contained the "would
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Clearly, the legislative history never directly addressed the compari-
son of the two standards. Thus, the Court's reasoning was based
solely on inferences.
The Court only weakened the impact of Cardoza-Fonseca by in-
cluding the analysis of legislative history. The statute is clear on its
face. If the statutory language is clear, the apparent meaning from
the language of the statute itself is effective.'I' In this case, the legis-
lative history is neither clear nor conclusive as to the congressional
intention for the proper standards. Since the Court specifically de-
clined to set forth guidelines for the application of the well-founded
fear test, its historical review of asylum and withholding of deporta-
tion proceedings was totally unnecessary. The statutory language is
clear that two different standards are applicable to the different pro-
visions. The legislative history might have been helpful in under-
standing the meaning of a well-founded fear, but the Court never
analyzed the meaning of the test.
Because the Court did not define a well-founded fear, Cardoza-
Fonseca may lead to continued uncertainty over the proper applica-
tion of this test. A conclusion could be drawn from the opinion that
the use of a partially subjective basis of determining eligibility for
asylum is acceptable. 112 Indeed, the Court did not address how
much objective proof must be presented in order to make a fear
"well-founded." The Court also made a quick reference to its dic-
tum in Stevic concerning the meaning of well-founded fear.' Nev-
ertheless, the fact that the Court expressly declined to describe the
well-founded fear test' 14 may annul any dicta applicable to an inter-
pretation of that test.
Although the Third Circuit and BIA differed from the other cir-
cuits as to the applicable standard, the remaining courts have given
different interpretations to the well-founded fear test. The U.S.
Courts of Appeals for the Second and Fifth Circuits used an analysis
of whether a reasonable person in the alien's circumstances would
fear persecution.'' 5 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, on the other hand, used a twofold requirement that "(1) the
alien have a subjective fear, and (2) that this fear have enough of a
''' Id. at 1213.
112 See id. at 1212-13.
1 ' Id. at 1217. "As we pointed out in Stevic, a moderate interpretation of the 'well-
founded fear' standard would indicate 'that so long as an objective situation is established
by the evidence, it need not be shown that the situation will probably result in persecution,
but it is enough that persecution is a reasonable possibility.' " Id. at 1217-18 (quoting
Stevic, 467 U.S. at 424-25).
114 Id. at 1222.
115 See, e.g., Carcamo-Flores v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 805 F.2d 60.
68 (2d Cir. 1986); Guevara-Flores v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. 786 F.2d
1242, 1249 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1565 (1987).
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basis that it can be considered well-founded."' 16 Finally, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit required the presentation
of either "specific facts" showing that the alien has already been per-
secuted or a "good reason to fear that [the alien] will be singled
out.''11 7 In light of the variety of interpretations, the Supreme
Court's avoidance of interpreting a well-founded fear could result in
an inconsistent application of the well-founded fear test. The re-
quirement of proof may be applied in practice by the lower courts
and the BIA so as to make the standard more stringent. By not de-
fining a well-founded fear, the Supreme Court left open the possibil-
ity that the theoretically distinct tests may be applied in an identical
manner.
In its first holding since Cardoza-Fonseca, the BIA-recognizing
that Acosta was overruled-followed the Supreme Court's declaration
that the well-founded fear standard was more generous than the
clear probability standard.' 18 The BIA noted the Supreme Court's
refusal to define the well-founded fear standard and proceeded to
review previous federal appellate opinions in an attempt to define
the term. After examining the federal cases," t 9 the agency adopted
the application used by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second
and Fifth Circuits12 0-"a reasonable person in her circumstances
would fear persecution." 121 But even this approach did not establish
firm guidelines for asylum proceedings. Indeed, two recent court of
appeals decisions remanded cases back to the BIA on the grounds
that the BIA used the well-founded fear language but did not sub-
stantively apply the less stringent standard of proof.122 In any event,
consistent BIA compliance with the holding in Cardoza-Fonseca re-
mains to be determined. Moreover, if the courts of appeals establish
different approaches to the well-founded fear test, further confusion
and inconsistency will once again permeate judicial review of asylum
proceedings.
The Supreme Court's holding in Cardoza-Fonseca was favorable
to aliens because it supported an easier standard of eligibility for asy-
lum. Consequently, if the less stringent standard is used, more
aliens will qualify for asylum. Because of the statute's discretionary
provision, however, the number of aliens granted asylum will not
I I ( Cardoza-Fonseca v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 767 F.2d 1448,
1452-53 (9th Cir. 1985).
117 Carvajal-Munoz v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th
Cir. 1984)(emphasis in original).
118 In re Mogharrabi, I. & N. Interim Dec. No. 3028, at 4 (BIA June 12, 1987).
111) Id. at 6-10.
120 See supra note 115.
121 In re Mogharrabi, I. & N. Interim Dec. No. 3028, at 9.
1'22 See Castaneda-Hernandez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 826 F.2d
1526, 1530-31 (6th Cir. 1987); Corado-Rodriguez v. Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice, 828 F.2d 622, 627-28 (9th Cir. 1987).
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necessarily increase. If the Attorney General grants more asylum re-
quests, the increase in the alien population may lead to unhappiness
among American citizens. Americans see immigrants as competition
for employment and welfare. Hence, the struggle between altruistic
policy and the perceived need to preserve scarce resources for U.S.
citizens will heighten. In view of these apparently conflicting poli-
cies, the BIA may well have had a good policy reason for equating
the two standards.
The Court's decision in Cardoza-Fonseca settled the debate over
the standard applicable to asylum and withholding of deportation
claims. Although the Court muddled its analysis with ambiguous
legislative history, the statutory language clearly conveyed an intent
to have two distinct standards. The big disappointment was the
Court's refusal to address the substantive interpretation of a well-
founded fear, aside from establishing that it was not equivalent to the
clear probability standard. Without a more explicit explanation of
the well-founded fear standard, judicial application of the standard
will likely be inconsistent. Eventually, the Supreme Court will have
to address the issue. Regretfully, more aliens will be forced to wade
through the current murky interpretation of the standard before a
firm judicial declaration is laid down.
ELAINE MOYE WHITFORD
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